Breaking Out of our Silos: How to Strengthen Relationships between Service-Specific Information Operations Communities, and Why We Need to by Stelmack, Robert & Gomez, Don
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Selected Student Publications
2021-07-12
Breaking Out of our Silos: How to Strengthen
Relationships between Service-Specific
Information Operations Communities, and
Why We Need to
Stelmack, Robert; Gomez, Don
Modern War Institute
Stelmack, Robert and Gomez, Don. "Breaking Out of Our Silos: How to Strengthen
Relationships between Service-Specific Information Operations Communities, and
Why We Need to. Modern War Institute. July 12, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67886
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
1/7
July 12, 2021
Breaking Out of Our Silos: How to Strengthen
Relationships Between Service-Specific Information
Operations Communities, and Why We Need To
mwi.usma.edu/breaking-out-of-our-silos-how-to-strengthen-relationships-between-service-specific-information-
operations-communities-and-why-we-need-to/
Editor’s note: This article is part of a series, “Full-Spectrum: Capabilities and Authorities in
Cyber and the Information Environment.” The series endeavors to present expert
commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competition with peer and near-peer
competitors in the cyber and information spaces. Read all articles in the series here.
Special thanks to series editors Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD of the Army Cyber Institute and
MWI fellow Dr. Barnett S. Koven.
In the past few years, joint force and interagency leaders have increasingly emphasized the
growing importance of information warfare. The US military services have each made strides
toward updating doctrine, procuring the right equipment, and reorganizing force structure to
better compete with our adversaries. The Joint Staff is working to publish JP 3-XX, which will
define the joint lexicon of operations in the information environment (OIE), information
warfare (IW), and the roles and responsibilities of the services both for organizing, training,
and equipping their OIE forces as well as how to employ them.*
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While these strategic updates are important and will assist in ensuring that the joint force
plans and executes operations from a point of shared understanding, there are activities and
initiatives that can be done now to ensure that we are best postured to compete globally.
Despite the popular image of electrons flowing through cyberspace, IW is inherently a human
endeavor, and getting the best minds together in the same room is the responsibility of
commanders everywhere. Strengthening the relationship between information warfare
professionals spread across the military services by leveraging formal and informal
relationships is an easy and cost-effective way to increase our competitive advantage. While
each service retains specialists, equipment, and knowledge spanning the spectrum of
information-related capabilities, this article will focus on the Air Force’s relatively new 14F
information operations (IO) officer, the Army’s psychological operations (PSYOP) 37 series,
and the Army’s FA30 (information operations) functional area.
It may come as a surprise to some that the Air Force possesses an information operations
capability. Understanding the history behind the Air Force specialty code 14F’s recent
establishment demonstrates why its development is so significant. While US Army PSYOP
forces and their capabilities are by no means new, the youth and size of the Army’s PSYOP
branch relative to the Army as a whole means that the shared knowledge within the joint
force about the unique capabilities of modern Army PSYOP forces remains quite low.
Many of the changes that are currently happening to information operations capabilities are a
direct result of the military’s strategic shift toward great power competition. The Department
of Defense is engaged in persistent competition, and in order to gain and maintain a
competitive advantage, the US military must be prepared to meet our adversaries wherever
and however they operate. Even though the tools and capabilities utilized for competition are
important, nothing will ever subsume the criticality of investing in human capital. It is our
hope, by highlighting the many opportunities to cut through imaginary barriers across the
services in this article, that we can collectively invigorate cross-service cooperation and
ultimately improve the effectiveness of the US military’s information warfare efforts.
So . . . the Air Force Does Information Operations?
In May 2018, the US Air Force established the IO badge, designed for those in the Air Force
specialty code 14F. IO officers integrate physical and informational Air Force capabilities to
influence target audiences or adversary decision making, including specialization for
leveraging PSYOP, military deception, and operations security. What makes a 14F unique
among both Air Force and joint force peers is the occupation’s particular focus on the social
sciences. It is a firm requirement that 14Fs hold a degree in a social science, like behavioral
science or anthropology. The Air Force believes that academic expertise enables 14Fs to
better integrate target audience personal, cultural, and cognitive biases into planning,
whether the target audience is a specific adversary decision maker or a neutral third-party
audience.
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Today, 14Fs are responsible for executing three specific mission types. The first, and most
common, is at the air operations center (AOC). The AOC is the beating heart of the joint
forces air component commander while in theater, fulfilling a similar role to a joint operations
center. It is through the AOC that the Air Force plans and executes air operations. Although
each AOC is organized in a similar way, every AOC includes its own unique mix of an
information operations team (IOT) and an influence operations cell within the IOT. It is also
common to find the influence operations cell manned entirely by 14Fs and possibly find the
IOT being led by one too. The IOT coordinates cyberspace operations, space, electronic
warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planners to enable
cohesive nonkinetic operations. In addition to those functions, many combatant command
and major command J39 billets—traditional IO staff directorates—are being filled by 14Fs as
well.
The second major mission for 14F officers is within special operations units. You may find
14Fs using their talents to combat disinformation through Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific,
where adversaries “continuously sow” disinformation to achieve their regional objectives.
Another point of interest would be US Special Operations Command’s new joint military
information support operations (MISO) WebOps Center, where 14Fs leverage their social-
science academic backgrounds to more effectively “address the opportunities and risks of
the global information space.”
The final mission for 14F officers is manning the various continental US-based reachback
units, like those found within 16th Air Force, the Air Force’s first information warfare
component numbered air force. The organization combines cyberspace operations,
electronic warfare, IO, ISR, and weather in order to present information warfare capabilities
and solutions to the various geographic combatant commands, with an emphasis on
reducing the information stovepiping that is common among the various information-related
capabilities in the military and interagency. Of particular note is the information warfare cell,
which has been integral to providing IW and other information-related capabilities, with a
particular emphasis on cyber-enabled MISO. Although a relatively recent development in
terms of Department of Defense years, 16th Air Force has set the standard for what
information operations and strategic communication should look like for the Air Force, and
14Fs have been a core part of that work.
So, yes, the Air Force “does” IO and does it well. The unique education requirements for the
Air Force’s 14Fs combined with planning and executing operations that emphasize
leveraging the cognitive domain, and career-enhancing opportunities (e.g., advanced
education and the Education with Industry program) make the Air Force 14Fs unique and
valuable members of the joint force’s IW roster.
Information Warfare Will Play a Lead Role in Great Power Competition
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Great power competition is the latest focus of leaders within the Pentagon. If the great power
competition trend began with former President Barack Obama’s rebalance toward the Pacific
region and continued with former President Donald Trump’s focus on the People’s Republic
of China, it is now solidifying under President Joe Biden. In particular, the White House’s
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance specifically calls out China as the United States’
most aggressive threat and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin refers to China as America’s
“pacing threat.”
Using the term great power competition to define interactions between the United States and
other global powers may be new, but the rules that define great power competition are not.
The most important of those rules—such as nuclear deterrence theory, mutually assured
destruction, and a norms-based international world order—are legacies of the Cold War.
However, what makes great power competition more dynamic is a renewed emphasis on IW
as a means of exercising soft and hard power.
While the purpose of this article is not to join the chorus of voices attempting to define IW—it
is important to recognize some of the term’s key attributes. For example, any definition of IW
will involve new technological developments, such as cyber warfare, social media, and space
operations, and some a bit older, like psychological operations or electronic warfare.
Definitions aside, one truth remains—leveraging the information function is all about
influencing your adversary’s decision-making cycle while protecting your own. This is where
the critical intersection of IW and great power competition comes into play. The process of
influencing adversary decision making was particularly important during the Cold War, where
one wrong move could set the world on a crash course toward nuclear war. In fear of a small
nation-on-nation kinetic engagement driving the Soviet Union and United States into full-on
conflict, the preferred methods of competition became those of intrigue and proxy wars—
terms that now all fall under competition below the threshold of armed conflict.
The IW revolution is expanding. With it, opportunities to compete under the threshold of
armed conflict are becoming increasingly more complicated and pronounced. Influence
operations are not limited to leaflets and loudspeakers but can now be expertly delivered
directly to the intended target audience with products carefully designed with the assistance
of data-driven artificial intelligence. Cyber operations allow adversaries to target nation-
states and nonstate actors with deniability. Space operations, which were once the business
of a handful of superpowers, now feature a diverse set of players competing for resources
and developing never-before-seen capabilities. Whereas the first space race was mostly a
battle of prestige, the modern iteration has nation-states competing with multinational
companies for limited orbital availability while also fielding new capabilities such as
continuous global coverage ISR, satellite-based internet, and more.
Winning in great power competition requires clear strategic vision and direction along with
desired end states. Influence operations coupled with new technological capabilities
represent the United States’ most potent tool to meet end states, all while competing under
the threshold of armed conflict. The practice of influencing adversary decision making is
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complicated and requires disciplined and well-coordinated whole-of-government operations,
the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities, and an understanding of how cognitive
factors impact an adversary leadership’s decision-making cycle. To conduct IW effectively,
the US military must leverage the cadre of professionals who have the multidisciplinary
education, experience, and dedication to increase our opportunities for success.
Getting IW Professionals in the Same Room
While the diversity of IW talent across the joint force is a good thing, we run the risk of
stovepiping our information professionals like our intelligence-related capabilities were
stovepiped in the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Each military service retains
tremendous IW talent. The unique assessment, selection, and training pipelines found
across the services leads to diversity of thought. If nothing else, even just the unique
qualities everyone brings to the fight based on their respective service’s culture enables joint
access to potential capabilities and personnel that might otherwise be missed or overlooked.
Ensuring that all IW capabilities are communicating, integrating, and operating together will
lead to increased chances for success in great power competition.
For its part, the Army retains numerous specialists in the constituent fields of IW—ranging
from electronic warfare and cyber operations specialists to graphic illustrators and
videographers. Compared to the Air Force’s 14F IO officer, it is the Army’s 37-series military
occupational specialties and FA30 functional area that maintain the most complementary skill
sets. Army PSYOP officers and noncommissioned officers and FA30 officers often find
themselves in similar roles as their Air Force counterparts—as part of an information
operations working group, often as the chief. PSYOP forces, with their focused training in
language, culture, and influence practices, are the Army’s premier influence agents,
exploiting psychological vulnerabilities to gain competitive advantage. FA30 officers are
trained in the integration of all information-related capabilities (e.g., MISO, military deception,
and PSYOP) and work to ensure information operations are well planned and coordinated to
achieve the commander’s intent and desired effects. While many of these functions may
seem similar, they each require extensive specialized training.
When information professionals from across the services are brought together effectively,
they can achieve incredible effects. In practice this cooperation seldom occurs outside of a
theater of operation. There are, however, opportunities for joint events throughout a unit’s
training cycle—usually in the form of joint multinational training exercises like Pacific Sentry
in the Indo-Pacific and Eager Lion in Jordan. Recently the Air Force ran its first information
warfare test exercise, which included opportunities to synchronize IO, electronic warfare,
cyberspace operations, and more. Joint exercises are fantastic training laboratories that
develop important lessons learned and shared understanding across the services. While
participation in joint training exercises should be encouraged and continued, there are
numerous opportunities for smaller-scale cooperation that can be leveraged and sustained
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over the course of a training year. Repeat exposure to joint force information warfare
specialists—and the informal and formal relationships that result—provides IW professionals
with a tremendous opportunity to accelerate their effectiveness.
First, missions that normally call for an Army 37 series or FA30 should also consider tasking
Air Force 14Fs as well. 14Fs are equally qualified to perform these tasks and also bring a
unique skill set and perspective that can enhance IO effectiveness. Additionally, the
experience and exposure 14Fs would gain through operating in these roles will lead to
increased coordination between joint information warfare professionals in the future. 
Second, formal, and informal exchanges should be expanded between the Air Force
information operations community and PSYOP units. These include increased attendance at
IW-related training courses (like the Army PSYOP Officer Qualification Course, which Air
Force 14Fs already attend), participating in unit exercises, and instructor exchanges. The
relationships developed between Army PSYOP and Air Force IO officers during these events
often lead to additional joint training opportunities during pre-mission training and even to
broader collaboration during operational deployments. We can attest to this, having
experienced it firsthand.
In reality, interservice coordination is, in large part, driven from the bottom up and requires
significant pushing and pulling to connect. Commanders—in both the Army and the Air Force
—should strongly incentivize and encourage their IW professionals to seek out, and
participate in, joint training opportunities. Units at all levels should routinely invite joint service
counterparts to participate in training—even for small unit–level exercises. The nature of
information warfare requires collaboration—training in a single-service, siloed environment is
unrealistic. Ultimately, the United States must learn to unify and coherently wield its IW
capabilities in concert to gain strategic advantage and to win in great power competition, and
the first step is to start bringing all IW forces together to foster collaboration and coordination.
Each military service has its own rich history of information warfare and service-specific
culture tends to color how IW professionals approach problems in the information domain—
and that is a good thing. However, the Department of Defense needs to be more creative
and committed to finding ways to bring all IW professionals together in the same room to
better leverage the skills of our joint partners if we are to gain advantage over our
adversaries in great power competition. Breaking down the imaginary barriers between
services and building bridges among the various IW specialties is crucial if our country is
going to compete against our near-peer foes in the modern era. To do this, we must focus on
growing the information warfare force we need for today, and for the future.
*While information warfare as a term has been in use for decades and has seen an uptick in
use recently, it remains an undefined term in joint doctrine. Similarly, information operations
does have a joint definition, but the services offer their own definitions as well. JP 3-XX is set
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to establish the joint terms for OIE, IW, and IO, and to encourage the services to adopt
similar language. The Air Force is currently set to revise its service definitions toward the JP
3-XX definitions.
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